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We examine how the intellectual property rights have an effect on the growth rate of the
economy. We focus on a role of IPR protection that prevent the free riding. By using a
simple endogenous growth model, we show that the existence of intellectual property rights
essentially brings a high growth rate.
Keywords : Endogenous Growth Model, Intellectual Property Rights, Differential Game Analy-
sis
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nopoly profit. In this case, the IPR protection
I. Introduction seems to be unrelated to the growth. This
model shows that eliminating the possibility of
We examine the role of the intellectual prop-　　　free riding, the IPR protection brings higher
erty rights (IPR) protection in economic incentive to invest even in the case. When the
growth. Though it has been studied whether IPR is not protected, representatives can access
strong protections of intellectual property will the fruit of the other representatives'R&D in-
stimulate or retard the innovation from both of vestments. Hence they may reduce the incen-
empirical and theoretical approach , relatively tive to invest in their production technology.
fewer have mentioned the dynamic process of The IPR protection rules out such a free riding
growth. A recent empirical study by Gould behavior.
and Gruden (1996) clarifies that the intellec-　　　We present a simple dynamic model. The
tual property protection is positively related to structure of our model follows that of the AK
economic growth. A theoretical model ofBarro model. The difference between our model and
and Sala-i-Martin (1995) shows the positive re-　　　the AK model comes forth from the assump-
lationship of intellectual property protection tions that the capital for production in our
and growth. We also show that the IPR protec-　　　model is stock of technology, not the broadly
tion ameliorates the growth rate of the econ-　　defined capital (it includes physical and human
omy as they have proved, but in a different capital) as the AK model supposes. The repre-
way.　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　sentatives are two groups and they produce and
In Barro and Sala-i-Martin's (1995)model,　　consume the goods. They also develop new
the technological improvement with the IPR technology. There exists the diffusion of knowl-
protection is supposed to bring the monopoly edge which informs every group about the
profit to the inventor. In that model, the mo-　　　other group's invention.
nopoly profit affects the motivation for invest-　　　If the IPR is protected, they cannot use the
ments and the economic growth. Insuring the other group's stock of technology without the
monopoly profit is undoubtedly one of the out-　　inventor's permission. We assume that when
comes of the IPR protection, but we pay atten-　　　they use the other group's stock of technology,
tion to another outcome. Likewise Romer's they exchange the license of their invention
(1986) or Benhabib and Rustichini's (1993)　　with the other group's license (cross licensing).
model, we assume that a new invention im-　　　When we investigate the case in which the IPR
proves the representative's productivity. On is not protected, since the diffusion of knowl-
this assumption, the representatives can enjoy edge enables every group to access the other
higher consumption utility when a new tech-　　　group's stock of technology, we regard the
nology is invented. They therefore have an in-　　economy's whole stock of technology as a com-
centive to invest even though there is no mo-　　　mon state variable. Therefore, m such a case
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